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1. The Basic Question
1 As a unifying theme of his research, Claude Vandeloise probed deeply into the rudiments
of human cognition as evidenced by the semantic analysis of  linguistic elements.  His
multifaceted investigations centered on elements naïvely and traditionally regarded as
“spatial” in nature, starting from his classic work on French prepositions (Vandeloise
1984, 1986, 1991). More than anyone else, he was responsible for exposing the conceptual
complexity of such elements,  showing conclusively that they cannot be characterized
solely in terms of spatial configuration. Indeed, he raised the basic question of whether
they are properly regarded as spatial at all,  or whether a functional characterization
might  be more fundamental  and descriptively  more adequate (Vandeloise  1985).  The
essential validity of this insight is now generally accepted in cognitive linguistics. The
need is thus recognized for an integrated account along the lines proposed by Vandeloise
himself  (2006),  in  which  both  spatial  and  functional  factors  are  accommodated  and
related to one another. Here my examination of these matters will be framed by a broader
consideration of how grammar relates to embodied cognition.
2 Along  with  Herskovits  (1986,  1988),  Vandeloise  established  the  basic  point  that  a
preposition  cannot  be  consistently  characterized  in  terms  of  a  single  spatial
configuration, even allowing for geometric idealization. The meaning of in is not just a
matter of spatial inclusion, as shown by the flower in that vase, where most of the flower
protrudes. Nor even partial inclusion, as witnessed by the now well-known example of a
pear, resting on a pile of apples, that is in a bowl despite being totally outside the bowl’s
spatial confines. Likewise, on cannot be consistently described as indicating contact with
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an upper surface (note the painting on the wall), contact with a surface (a fish on a hook), or
even contact (the book on the table may be resting on a stack of magazines).
3 These and many other problematic cases are neatly handled by a characterization in
terms of function: for in, the container function (a container holds its contents); and for
on, the support function (a bearer supports its burden). Yet function alone is insufficient.
The intuition that prepositions specify “locative” relationships cannot just be dismissed.
There are uses  where spatial  location is  the primary if  not  the exclusive motivating
factor.  In examples like the smile  on his  face and the shadow on the wall,  the notion of
support is either very tenuous or absent altogether. Spatial configuration alone is enough
to motivate expressions like the dot in the circle. As noted by Vandeloise (1991: 219-220),
full spatial inclusion contributes to the felicity of the brain in his head, for in general in is
not used for constitutive parts (cf. *the nose in his face). Moreover, an account based solely
on the support and container functions fails to explain why the supporting or containing
entity is coded by the prepositional landmark (or object), in contrast to verbs like support,
contain, or hold, which code it as the trajector (or subject).
4 Hence the meaning of a preposition cannot be captured by a single semantic specification
pertaining  to  either  function  or  configuration.  Instead,  according  to  the  view  now
prevailing in cognitive linguistics, prepositional meanings are complex in two respects.
First,  an element exhibits a range of conventional senses or established uses,  usually
anchored by a central case with respect to which the others can be seen as motivated
extensions.  The central case goes by various names, such as prototype (Lakoff 1987),
spatial scene (Tyler and Evans 2003), conceptual schema (Navarro i Ferrando 1998), and
for Vandeloise, (logical)  impetus ( impulsion).  While these notions are not necessarily
equivalent, the differences can largely be ignored for present purposes. Second, a given
value—especially  the  central  one—is  complex  in  that  its  characterization  involves
multiple,  coexisting  factors.  For  instance,  Deane  (1993,  2005)  posits  a  “multimodal”
description comprising  visual,  motor,  and force-dynamic  images.  Navarro  i  Ferrando
proposes a similar scheme whose factors include the topology of objects, the motion and
force involved in interacting with them, and their function.
5 The term function works well for in and on. The function of a container is to hold its
contents, and a pedestal has the function of supporting a statue. Vandeloise points out,
however, that in its usual sense the term is a bit too narrow: “La nature de ces primitifs
diffère et le terme fonctionnel ne s’applique exactement qu’à certains d’entre eux comme
les  relations  porteur/porté  et  contenant/contenu.  D’autres  sont  plutôt  de  caractère
anthropomorphique, liés à la forme du corps humain ou à son système perceptif” (1985:
119).  Among the additional  factors  he cites  are physical  and perceptual  access  (sous, 
derrière), order of potential encounter (avant), and direction based on general and lateral
orientation (devant,  à gauche).  His term anthropomorphic would seem to capture the
essential unity of these various notions, which pertain to human interaction with the
world at the physical, perceptual, and purposive levels. It is roughly comparable to what
cognitive linguists refer to as embodiment (Johnson 1987; Lakoff 1987; Ziemke, Zlatev,
and Frank 2007; Frank, Dirven, Ziemke, and Bernárdez 2008).
6 As an overall characterization, Vandeloise (2006) arrived at the following formulation.
The central value of a spatial element (its impetus) consists in a complex primitive. This
is a primitive in the sense of being pre-linguistic, and complex in the sense that numerous
propositions  are  needed  to  describe  it  exhaustively.  Despite  their  complexity,  these
primitives are readily grasped as wholes due to their anthropomorphic nature; they are
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“unified by their function in our survival in the world” (150). Thus in a complex primitive
the multiple factors relevant for describing an element are all present simultaneously.
For  example,  the  primitive  for  in  front  of—“general  orientation”—is  defined  by  the
coincidence  of  line  of  sight,  direction  of  motion,  and  frontal  orientation  defined
anatomically. The primitive for in combines configurational properties (concavity, spatial
inclusion)  with  the  interactive  properties  they  afford  (storage,  protection,
multidirectional control).
 
2. Grammar and Human Experience
7 This  characterization  by  Vandeloise  meshes  well  with  some basic  ideas  of  Cognitive
Grammar (Langacker 1987a, 1991a, 2008a). Among these, naturally, are general notions of
cognitive  linguistics  like  embodiment  (the  anthropomorphic  principle)  and polysemy
(whereby a lexical meaning consists in a range of values centered on a prototype). A more
specific  point  is  the  importance  ascribed  in  Cognitive  Grammar  (henceforth  CG)  to
conceptual archetypes, which seem quite comparable to complex primitives. Conceptual
archetypes are experientially grounded concepts so frequent and fundamental  in our
everyday life that we tend to invoke them as anchors in constructing our mental world
with all its richness and levels of abstraction. Since they pertain to many different aspects
of experience, and archetypal status is a matter of degree, there is no fixed inventory. For
sake of concreteness, I will cite just a few examples: a physical object, an object moving
through space, a person, the human face, a whole and its parts, maintaining a posture,
walking, seeing something, saying something, holding something, handing something to
someone. Also qualifying as archetypes are the functions of containment and support, as
well as the factors involved in general orientation.
8 As noted by Vandeloise for complex primitives, archetypes are basic conceptual units
readily  grasped  in  gestalt-like  fashion,  even  though  explicit  descriptions  are  hard  to
formulate, seem less than revealing, and require numerous statements. For instance, we
are  clearly  disposed  to  apprehend  physical  objects,  which  are  fundamental  to  the
construction  of  our  mental  world,  but  it  is  not  at all  easy  to  devise  a  satisfactory
definition of the notion. Likewise, walking is very basic to our experience, and seems
quite simple once we learn to do it, but actually describing the activity (e.g. in enough
detail to model it) is very difficult. Conceptual archetypes represent salient, essentially
universal aspects of everyday experience, as determined by the interplay of biological
and environmental factors. Their emergence is a natural consequence of how we interact
with the physical and social world, having evolved to cope with it successfully.
9 It  should  come  as  no  surprise  that  conceptual  archetypes  play  a  significant  role  in
language.  More  specific  archetypes  are  strong  candidates  for  lexical  expression.  We
would expect most any language encountered to have lexemes roughly comparable, say,
to person,  face,  sit,  go,  see,  hold,  give,  in,  and on.  Such expressions tend to be extended
metaphorically to abstract uses (e.g. ‘face’ > ‘in front of’,  ‘see’ > ‘understand’,  ‘hold’ >
‘have’)  and commonly serve as lexical sources for grammaticization (e.g. ‘sit’ > STATIVE,
‘go’ > FUTURE, ‘give’ > BENEFACTIVE). At a more schematic level, certain archetypes have
evident grammatical significance even in the absence of lexical expression. Examples of
this  sort  are  basic  semantic  roles  like  agent,  patient,  instrument,  and  experiencer.
Moreover,  archetypes  at  this  level  of  abstraction  function  as  the central  values  of
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grammatical categories—for instance, agent as the prototype for subjects, and physical
object for nouns.
10 This leads to a basic claim of CG that is controversial but nonetheless both natural and a
source of conceptual unification. It pertains to certain grammatical notions reasonably
considered both fundamental and universal;  while there is no definite inventory (this
being  a  matter  of  degree),  a  minimal  list  includes  noun,  verb,  subject,  object,  and
possessive. Such notions, it is claimed, are susceptible to semantic characterization at two
different levels: the prototype level (for central instances) and the schema level (for all
instances).  In  each  case  the  prototype  is  an  experientially  grounded  conceptual
archetype. By contrast, the schemas have no specific conceptual content, residing instead
in basic cognitive abilities (or mental operations). These abilities are immanent in the
corresponding archetypes, i.e. they “lie within them”, being inherent in their conception.
In developmental  terms,  the abilities  are initially manifested in the archetypes—they
provide the basis for structured experience and are thus responsible for the archetypes
emerging in the first place. Subsequently, the same operations are applied to other sorts
of conceptions, in which they are not inherent, thus extending the category they define
to non-central instances.
11 Physical  object  is  the archetype serving as the prototype for nouns.  Their  schematic
characterization consists  in  cognitive  abilities  inherent  in  the very conception of  an
object:  conceptual  grouping and reification,  by  which a  group is  apprehended as  a
unitary entity for higher-level  purposes (Langacker 1991b,  2008a:  ch.  4).  For physical
objects themselves, these operations proceed automatically below the level of conscious
awareness. They become more evident when extended to other circumstances, giving rise
to non-prototypical nouns such as those designating groups (e.g. herd), abstract things (
month), or reified events (birth). The prototype for verbs is an agent-patient interaction.
The schema—ascribed to verbs in general—consists in apprehending a relationship and
tracking its development through time. The two participant roles in the verb archetype,
agent and patient, function respectively as the prototypes for subject and object. As their
schematic import, subject and object are characterized as  primary and secondary focal
elements in a relationship, reflecting our mental ability to direct and focus attention
within  a  scene  (Langacker  1999a).  A  number  of  archetypes  are  prototypical  for
possessives,  including ownership,  kinship,  and whole-part relations (Langacker 1995a,
2004a; Taylor 1996). Proposed as the schema for possessives is our capacity for invoking
one conceived entity as a reference point in order to mentally access another (Langacker
1993a).
12 These notions are central to a unified account of the development and relationship of
conceptual and linguistic structure. At all stages and levels of organization, structure is
seen as dynamic,  residing in patterns of processing activity. The account begins with
conceptions  that  emerge  through  embodied  experience  as  we  interact  with  our
surroundings in the manner afforded by basic cognitive abilities. From this basis, some
very  general  processes—occurring  repeatedly,  over  a  long  period  time,  at  many
successive levels—make possible the construction of our mental world in all its richness
and complexity. Through recurrence, common experiences are progressively entrenched
,  coalescing  into  established  cognitive  routines  readily  activated  and  executed  as
prepackaged wholes.  Of course,  since every experience is unique at the level of fine-
grained detail, any commonality that is reinforced and established as a routine is bound
to be coarse-grained relative to the specific conceptions giving rise to it. The abstraction
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(or schematization) which thus occurs can in principle can be carried to any degree.
Another general process is simulation (or disengagement), whereby abstracted routines
are executed independently of the circumstances in which they originated.
13 Conceptions emerge at different levels of specificity. For example, we can apprehend a
particular cup with distinguishing features; being directly tied to immediate experience,
conceptions  of  this  sort  are  readily  accessible  to  conscious  awareness.  Also  quite
accessible, representing the usual level of lexical expression, is the abstracted conception
of a cup as a prototype or a more inclusive type. More schematic notions like container
and physical object, which neutralize many types of this sort, are less likely to be coded
by basic vocabulary.  As specific  and more general  archetypes,  they nonetheless have
conceptual and linguistic significance, e.g. physical object as the prototype for nouns.
This more general archetype, while abstracting away from all specific detail, can still be
characterized as the manifestation of basic cognitive abilities (grouping and reification)
in  their  primary  domain  of  application  (the  physical  realm  of  space  and  material
substance).  A  further  degree  of  abstraction  consists  in  the  disengagement  of  these
abilities, i.e. their application outside the physical realm. Being devoid of specific content,
these abilities are not per se subject to conscious awareness. They do however constitute
the schematic import of nouns, inhering in the archetype that serves as the category
prototype, and providing the basis for its extension to non-prototypical members.
14 Mental simulation, involving conceptions at various levels of abstraction, has a number of
basic functions in cognition. We recall events we experience by partially simulating that
experience. In the guise of perceptual, motor, and kinesthetic imagery, simulation is an
important  aspect  of  lexical  meaning.  Part  of  the  meaning  of  cup,  for  example,  are
schematized images representing what one looks like and what it feels like to use one. At
higher levels of abstraction, the disengaged application of mental operations figures in
imaginative phenomena like metaphor, blending, and fictivity (Lakoff and Johnson 1980;
Fauconnier  and Turner  2002;  Langacker  1999b).  In  metaphor,  conceptions  abstracted
from a source domain are applied in the apprehension of a target domain; e.g. a set and
its members are apprehended in terms of a container and its contents (Lakoff 1987). The
container  and  content  invoked  are  not  of  any  specific  sort,  but  are  rather  general
archetypes. According to the invariance hypothesis (Lakoff 1990), what is projected onto
the target is the source domain’s image schematic structure. However, it is not made
very  explicit  what  level  of  abstraction  this  represents  (cf.  Hampe  2005).  One
interpretation—consistent with Johnson (1987), who emphasizes the dynamic nature of
image  schemas—is  that  the  mental  operations  inherent  in  conceiving  and  reasoning
about the source are manifested in the target (Langacker 2006; cf. Grady 2005, 2008).
15 Slightly different from metaphor is the phenomenon known as fictive motion (Langacker
1986, 2005; Matsumoto 1996; Talmy 1996; Matlock 2001, 2004), as in the following: A thin
crack runs from the corner of the window to the ceiling. In their primary sense, expressions
like run and from X to Y pertain to motion along a spatial path. Here, though, they describe
a static situation. What happens is that mental operations inherent in the conception of
spatial  motion are disengaged from such motion and applied for a different purpose.
Specifically, the conceptualizer traces a mental path through space not by way of tracking
an object’s movement, but rather as a dynamic means of apprehending its configuration.
The path registered by this scanning operation is not traversed by a moving object, but
solely  by  the  conceptualizer,  who  traces  along  the  object  in  building  up  to  a  full
conception of its spatial extension.
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16 In the final analysis,  all  conceptions are dynamic, residing in processing activity that
unfolds through time. But as they become more schematic, abstracting away from any
specific  content,  their  dynamic  nature  becomes  more  evident  and  it  seems  more
reasonable to regard them as mental operations or cognitive abilities. This is so for a
number of fundamental notions that are independent of any particular domain, such as
path, group, continuity, and change. It makes no real difference whether we view these as
elemental  concepts  or  as  basic  mental  capacities:  scanning,  grouping,  registration of
sameness,  detection of  a difference.  In various combinations,  moreover,  such notions
form general cognitive models which, despite their schematicity, are significant by virtue
of being ubiquitous and manifested in many realms of experience. One such model is the
abstract  conception  of  a  bounded  event,  where  scanning  through  time  registers
continuity interrupted by an episode of change. At a higher level of organization, the
recurrence of events figures in the notion of a cycle (Grady 2005). I have argued that a
very general cyclic conception (the “control cycle”) is inherent in many aspects of human
experience and is relevant to the characterization of numerous linguistic phenomena
(Langacker 2004b, 2008b, 2008c). For instance, successive phases of this cycle are reflected
in sets of verbs like want > get > have or suspect > learn > know.
17 An overall picture thus emerges in which conceptions at different levels of abstraction
tend to have certain roles in language structure. While they are not necessarily discrete
or well-delimited, three levels are especially relevant for present purposes. At the first
level  are  fairly  specific  concepts  of  the  sort  coded by  lexical  items  that  are  simple,
frequent,  and  acquired  early,  such  as  cup.  These  roughly  correspond  to  concepts
representing  basic  level  categories (Rosch  1978).  Though  schematic  relative  to  the
conception  of  particular  instances  or  subtypes,  the  notion  cup still  incorporates  a
recognizable shape specification (visual image) and mode of interaction (motor image).
Depending  on  their  cognitive  and  cultural  salience,  notions  of  this  sort  might  be
considered  archetypal.  At  the  second  level  are  more  schematic  conceptions  whose
archetypal status is perhaps more evident, e.g. the generalized notion of a container, or
more abstractly,  of  a physical  object.  Such archetypes are more directly relevant for
grammar owing to their greater generality: while still pertaining to physical entities, they
abstract away from any particular shape or motor routine. Instead, their configurational
and interactive properties are constituted by elemental, domain-independent concepts
(or  mental  operations)  like  grouping,  bounding,  inclusion,  access,  and control.  These
represent a third level of abstraction. And being independent of any specific content,
they are not limited to the physical realm—resulting, for instance, in certain container-
like properties being ascribed to abstract entities such as sets or mental states (e.g. in love
).
18 These levels figure in the CG claim that certain fundamental grammatical notions can be
characterized semantically in terms of both a prototype and a schema: serving as the
former are general archetypes (e.g.  physical object,  in the case of nouns),  and as the
latter, basic cognitive abilities inherent in their conception (grouping and reification).
The  levels  also  have  diachronic  import.  Lexical  items  representing  archetypes  most
commonly function as source expressions for grammaticization. And to the extent that
this process entails the loss of specific conceptual content, mental operations immanent
in the archetypes are left to operate independently, thereby emerging as the essential
semantic import of grammaticized elements. For example, when a verb like sit, stand, or
lie grammaticizes into a general marker of stativity, specifications of shape and posture
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gradually fade away. Its remaining conceptual import consists in mental operations: the
registration  of  sameness  while  scanning  through  time.  Likewise,  general  possessive
predicates evolve from verbs of physical control, such as hold, grab, or carry (Heine 1997).
This comes about as they are extended to non-physical domains and the notion of control
is progressively attenuated (Langacker 1999c).  At the extreme, all  that remains is the
reference point ability: that of invoking one conceived entity as a basis for accessing or
interpreting  another  (Langacker  1993a,  1995a,  1999c,  2004a).  This  represents  the
schematic  characterization of  possessives,  immanent in the prototypes of  ownership,
kinship, and whole-part relations.
 
3. Clausal Organization
19 The overall scheme just outlined concerns the conceptual basis of lexicon and grammar,
which are seen in CG as forming a continuum. In accordance with this view, prepositions
appear  to  be  intermediate—they  are  sometimes  regarded  as  lexical,  sometimes  as
grammatical, and sometimes both. They prove to be intermediate in other ways as well.
To see this,  we must first  examine the conceptual  basis  for certain aspects of  clause
structure.
20 A  key  to  understanding  grammar  lies  in  the  recognition  that  particular  conceptual
archetypes—especially salient due to their prevalence in moment-to-moment experience
—provide the prototypical values of basic categories and canonical constructions. These
are,  of  course,  extended beyond their  central  values to accommodate the immensely
varied array of  conceptions requiring linguistic  expression.  Their  extension relies  on
mental  operations inherent in the archetype,  and for categories with a wide enough
range of members, a schematic characterization consists in just these operations (rather
than any specific content). Nonetheless, it is in the experientially grounded archetypes
that we find the rationale for canonical aspects of grammatical organization.
21 A constant feature of our experience is that we, as well as the entities we directly interact
with,  are  small  and compact  relative  to  the far  greater  extensionality  of  our  spatial
surroundings.  This  is  reflected  in  the  archetypal  distinction  participant vs.  setting,
which has  numerous  grammatical  ramifications  even when covert  (Langacker  1987b,
1990: 230-234). Although these notions are flexibly construed, typical sorts of participants
include people,  animals,  and physical  objects,  while  some typical  settings are rooms,
buildings, cities, and nations. A location is any portion of a setting delimited for some
purpose  (e.g.  as  the  place  where  a  certain  participant  can  be  found).  An  important
dimension of this archetypal conception is that participants are conceived as interacting
with one another, but merely occupy settings and locations. For instance, I can interact
in many ways with an object, say a pencil: by picking it up, writing with it, breaking it,
putting in somewhere, etc. These are all force-dynamic interactions that affect the object
in some manner.  But  under normal  circumstances  there is  little  I  can do by way of
forcefully interacting with my global surroundings—I merely inhabit the North American
continent, having relatively little impact on it.
22 Viewed through the eyes of modern science, the physical entities that populate our world
range from the unimaginably small  (atoms,  subatomic particles)  to the unimaginably
large (the universe or multiverse). What counts for language, however, are conceptual
archetypes deriving from normal human experience. On a human scale, and from the
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human perspective, physical entities are more naturally viewed in terms of a spectrum
ranging  from  canonical  participants  to  the  most  global  spatial  settings.  The  most
canonical of participants is a person. Based on a number of salient properties—size being
only one—we can observe a maximal opposition between the entities at the endpoints of
the  spectrum.  In  contrast  to  an  all-encompassing  setting,  a  person  is  small,  clearly
bounded, mobile, energetic, alive, and sentient. Extending from either extreme is a range
of  entities  whose  status  as  participant  or  setting  is  equally  canonical:  non-human
participants like animals and easily manipulated objects;  and bounded settings, like a
continent, a valley, or a field. Of course, many sorts of entities are intermediate, seeming
more participant-like or more setting-like depending on the circumstances. A chair and a
bench both qualify as participants, being objects that we interact with in various ways,
but the latter, due to its greater size and lesser movability, is more readily conceived as a
location (a place that people merely occupy).
23 The two ends of the spectrum represent fundamental and complementary aspects (or
“realms”) of human experience. The active realm is that of action, change, and force,
where mobile creatures—the paragon being a volitional human agent—act on the world.
By contrast, the circumstantial realm is that of settings, locations, and static situations,
where objects with stable properties are arranged in particular ways. These two aspects
of  our  experience  are  of course  not  separate  but  interdependent:  on  the  one  hand,
circumstances define the potential for activity and provide the stage on which it unfolds;
on the other hand, activity alters the circumstances and thus the potential for subsequent
activity.  But  despite  their  complementarity  and indissociability,  the realms are quite
unequal from the human standpoint. The special status of people, as both the paragon for
actors and the center of their own mental universe, imposes an asymmetry wherein the
active realm is central, the circumstantial realm peripheral. Hence the spectrum leading
from canonical participant to canonical setting is not apprehended in neutral fashion, but
egocentrically, from our position at one extremity. From this perspective it amounts to
an abstract scale of “distance”, based on such factors as likeness to people, the potential
for interaction, and the possibility of empathy.
24 We  have  so  far  considered  these  archetypal  conceptions  in  their  own  terms,
independently of language. They do however have many linguistic manifestations. For
example, the scale of distance (sometimes called the “empathy hierarchy”) plays a role in
English  possessives.  As  noted  by  Deane  (1987),  possessors  representing  successive
positions along this scale (e.g. person > animal > object > setting) are increasingly less
likely to be expressed by a pre-nominal genitive, and more likely to be expressed by a
post-nominal of-phrase: the baby’s head vs. ??the head of the baby; the cat’s tail vs. ?the tail of
the cat; ?the table’s leg vs. the leg of the table; ??the valley’s floor vs. the floor of the valley. Also,
and more relevant for present purposes, the archetypes discussed have a significant role
in clausal organization.
25 The labels for the two realms allude to the distinction drawn by Tesnière (1965) between
actant and circonstant, reflecting a basic asymmetry among the nominal elements in a
clause. It is seen most clearly in the differences between subject and object nominals, on
the one hand, and those with adverbial function, on the other. In grammatical terms, the
former  are  usually  obligatory  in  a  clause,  the  latter  optional.  Also,  the  former  are
normally expressed by bare nominals or marked by “grammatical” cases, whereas the
latter are introduced periphrastically (by adpositions)  or marked by cases with more
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evident semantic  content.  Conceptually,  of  course,  subjects  and objects  are generally
participants, while the specification of settings and locations is typical for adverbials.
26 Thus the maximal  conceptual  opposition between archetypes at  the two ends of  the
spectrum—a volitional human agent and an all-compassing setting—is mirrored by the
very different grammatical properties of subjects and adverbial expressions. Now it is
typical for a maximal opposition to be exhibited by elements with the greatest salience.
For example, the distinction between two categories is generally most evident in their
prototypes (peripheral members may be quite similar). And if we consider the range of
grammatical categories, the two most prominent—nouns and verbs—are polar opposites
with respect to both their prototypes and their schematic characterizations (Langacker
1991a, 2008a). Due to their maximal opposition, it might therefore be expected that the
archetypes human agent and global setting would canonically be associated with the two
most salient elements in a clause. This is not the case, however. In the CG analysis, the
two most salient elements of a clause are the subject and object, characterized as the
primary and secondary focal elements in the relationship it designates. But while the
subject is canonically an agent, the global setting is certainly not a typical object.
27 Why not? The evident reason is that the archetypes are arranged not only in terms of a
maximal opposition, but also a center and a periphery. From the perspective of human
agents,  the  active  realm is  central,  the  circumstantial  realm peripheral.  It  stands  to
reason, then, that clauses should be primarily concerned with actions and events, and
only secondarily with static circumstances.  So for purposes of  clause structure,  what
counts as a maximal opposition is the one observed within the active realm, between the
participants in an interaction. The role archetypes exhibiting this maximal contrast are
agent and patient. In a canonical agent-patient interaction (e.g. She sliced the cake), the
agent  is  a  person  who  acts  intentionally,  functions  as  the  energy  source,  and  is
unchanged by the event. The patient is the polar opposite in each respect: it is inanimate
(hence non-volitional), absorbs the energy, and is changed as a consequence. It is thus to
be expected that subject and object, characterized schematically in terms of primary and
secondary focal prominence, would have agent and patient as their prototypes.
28 To be sure, not every sentence has an agent for its subject and a patient for its object. The
most one can say is that this arrangement has some claim to being both optimal and
canonical: optimal in that the two most prominent grammatical roles are co-aligned with
the two most salient participant archetypes; and canonical by virtue of representing the
default coding for a type of occurrence both ubiquitous and of prime importance from
our egocentric perspective. But obviously, there are many departures from this canon, as
many other factors play a role in shaping language structure. Even a canonical agent-
patient  interaction may,  for  discourse  reasons,  be  coded with non-default  alignment
(with a passive, for example). The most general, factor, however, is simply the vast and
varied range of occurrences that need to be described. As the basic pattern of a two-
participant clause is extended to more and more kinds of interactions, subject and object
are extended beyond the agent and patient prototypes to other participant roles. In She
recognized it, the subject is an experiencer rather than an agent, and the object is a non-
patient, being quite unaffected by the interaction.
29 An additional factor is that agentive interactions are not the only sort of occurrence
sufficiently prevalent and important to motivate a basic clause type. For one thing, we
engage the world not just physically but also mentally, interacting with other entities
through  perception  and  thought.  It  is  quite  common  (as  just  illustrated)  for  such
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occurrences  to be expressed in the same manner as  physical  interactions.  But  many
languages accommodate this archetype by means of a distinct clausal pattern, generally
involving a dative-marked element which is either the subject or has certain subject-like
properties.  Furthermore,  not  every  occurrence  is  interactive.  Few  aspects  of  our
experience are more frequent and fundamental than the activity of moving around in
space.  While this usually has an interactive purpose,  it  does not per se constitute an
interaction (since we merely occupy locations). For describing spatial motion, probably
every language has a basic type of clause consisting of a subject, a motion verb, and a
locational complement serving to specify the path or goal (e.g. She walked into the room).
And  finally,  since  our  concerns  extend  beyond  the  active  realm,  we  need  ways  of
describing stable circumstances. This is often accomplished through clauses consisting of
a subject, a be-type verb, and a complement specifying a property or static location (e.g.
She is {clever / in her study}).
30 It is crucial to bear in mind that conceptual archetypes are not intrinsic to the world but
are rather a matter of how we apprehend it. A limited inventory cannot do justice to the
complexity  and  variability  of  our  experience,  which  is  hardly  susceptible  to  rigid
categorization.  A given entity  can thus  be viewed and categorized in alternate  ways
depending on the situation and how we choose to construe it for linguistic purposes. A
room is usually just a setting, but we can also engage it in an interaction (e.g. by cleaning,
painting,  or  merely  examining it),  in  which case  it  counts  as  a  participant.  A cat  is
agentive in regard to catching mice, but may only be a location if we are talking about the
travels  of  a  flea.  Through  their  flexible  application,  archetypes  grounded  in  basic
experience provide a basis for apprehending and describing any aspect of our real or
mentally constructed world.
 
4. The Place of Prepositions
31 It is usual for languages to have a basic clause type canonically used for describing stable
situations  in  the  circumstantial  realm.  In  one  common  pattern,  this  type  of  clause
employs a be-type predicate whose complement specifies a property of the subject (It is
heavy) or its spatial location (It is on the counter). The latter represents one primary use of
prepositions and comparable elements. Yet even these core circumstantial expressions
have close connections with the active realm. The properties ascribed to objects generally
have some kind of interactive basis (Langacker 1995b); something heavy is hard to lift. In
describing something as being on the counter,  we would normally also entertain some
conception of movement or activity involving it: how it got there, or how to reach it in
order to use it.
32 The point is a general one: even if we focus on the purely spatial import of prepositions,
the active realm is important for understanding their semantics and grammar. Spatial
relationships  are  prime  components  of  the  circumstantial  realm  (that  of  settings,
locations, and stable arrangements), but we are most concerned with this realm as a stage
for human action. This is reflected in the sorts of entities most commonly chosen as the
primary and secondary focal elements in the relationship designated by a preposition. In
CG, these elements are referred to as the trajector and the landmark. Now one might
expect that, for describing stable spatial arrangements, setting-like entities would tend to
function in both capacities. But while this is certainly possible, e.g. Canada is in North
America, it is hardly canonical (except in geography lessons). More typical are expressions
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like Jill is in the garage, in which the trajector is a participant and the landmark is a local
setting (or location) rather than a global one. With respect to the distance scale, ranging
from a human agent at one extreme to an all-encompassing setting at the other, the
trajector tends to lie toward the former pole, and the landmark toward the middle—not
the opposite extreme. The center of gravity is thus in the active realm.
33 In clauses that specify static location, the trajector is canonically either a person or a
movable physical object: She’s on the porch; It’s in that drawer. In each case the participant
role it instantiates is a mere shadow of the role it has in the agent-patient archetype
central to the active realm. I suggest, however, that this archetype does indeed cast its
shadow—although the trajector’s role approximates zero in regard to action, change, and
force, these notions are still relevant to its characterization.
34 The role of  a person who merely occupies a location represents the extreme case of
attenuation (Langacker  1999c)  vis-à-vis  the  archetype  of  a  volitional  human  agent.
Starting from a canonical agent-patient interaction (e.g. She smashed the vase),  we can
note  several  steps  along  this  path,  each  resulting  in  another  archetypal  conception
associated with a basic clause type. There is first a single-participant event coded by a
simple  intransitive  clause  (e.g.  She  stood  up).  While  this  is  an action rather  than an
interaction, the subject is still a volitional actor exerting energy. A particular kind of
action, one having great importance and cognitive salience, is that of moving around in
space. Corresponding to such events are intransitive clauses containing a movement verb
and a complement describing the path of motion (e.g. She walked along the river). While
movement requires the expenditure of  energy,  its  force-dynamic aspect  is  usually of
lesser interest than the trajector’s changing location. Motion events are thus ambivalent,
lending themselves to construal either as actions or simply as occurrences in which the
trajector occupies a series of positions through time. (This distinction may be marked
overtly, e.g. by a have-type vs. a be-type auxiliary in the perfect, as argued for Dutch by
Beliën [2008: §5.5].) Static location can then be regarded as the degenerate case of such
movement, where the trajector occupies the same position throughout. But even here we
have the shadow of interaction. Being in a particular place makes it possible to perform
certain actions, which normally provide the reason for moving there. And a common
reason to specify a person’s location is that it bears on the possibility of interacting with
her.
35 Likewise, an inanimate object that merely occupies a location represents an extreme case
of attenuation vis-à-vis the archetypal role of patient. In a sentence like She broke it, the
object is affected in the strong sense of undergoing an internal change of state; in She put
it on the desk it is affected only in the weaker sense of undergoing a change in location;
and it is not affected at all in descriptions of static location, e.g. It is on the desk. Once
again, interaction casts its shadow on such expressions. If an object occupies a particular
location,  it  is  usually  because  someone  put  it  there  for  a  certain  purpose.  And  we
commonly specify its location so that someone will be able to use it.
36 The landmark of a spatial preposition tends to be intermediate on the scale of distance.
Though presumably accurate, it is generally not very useful to be informed that Jill is in
the solar system or that Your keys are in North America. Several kinds of entities canonically
serve as spatial  landmarks.  The first  consists of  entities such as enclosures,  bounded
areas, and geographical regions of limited extent: Jill is in {her room / the house / the back
yard /  Chicago}.  These are naturally viewed as locations,  being characterized more by
spatial expanse than by material substance. Next are material objects which, due to size
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and relative immobility,  lend themselves to being construed as locations rather than
participants: She is {in the bathtub / at her desk / on that bench}. But it is not at all unusual
for entities normally construed as participants to function as landmark: It is {in my wallet
/ under that magazine / beside the vase / behind the paint cans}.
37 We can observe in these examples a general trend for a wider range of prepositions to
occur with landmarks more readily viewed as participants. The reason, evidently, is that
the landmark’s function is to specify a location, and landmarks which are not inherently
locational fail to do so with any precision. The landmark entity is thus invoked, not as a
location in and of itself, but rather as a point of reference for defining one. It is defined by
the preposition. As the distinctive aspect of its meaning, each spatial preposition specifies
a region in space, characterized in relation to the landmark object,  within which the
trajector can be found:  its  interior  (in),  the region adjacent  to it  (beside),  its  general
neighborhood (near),  etc.  In this  way a set  of  prepositions provides a  highly flexible
means of using an object to locate another entity.
38 How can multiple spatial regions be characterized in terms of a single reference object? A
natural strategy is to base the definitions on parts of the object, or—by metaphorical
projection—on parts of the human body (MacLaury 1989; Langacker 2002). This strategy is
evident in complex prepositional locutions: by the side of the river; at the top of the stairs; in
the back of the room.  It is further evident in complex prepositions at various stages of
grammaticization (in front  of,  in back of,  on top of,  ahead of,  alongside,  atop)  and in the
vestigial analyzability of certain simple prepositions (beside, behind, before). To the extent
that  prepositional  expressions  are  analyzable,  they  manifest  overtly  the  conceptual
distinction between a reference object and a spatial region defined in relation to it.
39 Thus  three  major  entities,  each  with  a  different  function,  figure  in  the  conceptual
characterization of a spatial preposition. The trajector (translated by Vandeloise as cible)
functions  as  the  target of  search,  the  entity  one  is  trying  to  locate.  The  landmark
functions as a reference point for purposes of  finding it.  Defined in relation to this
reference point—hence mentally accessible through it—is a limited region within which
the target can be found. This is called the search domain (Hawkins 1984;  Langacker
1993b, 2004a). It should be noted that terms like “search”, “find”, and “reference point”
are not just metaphorical.  A common reason for using a locative expression, e.g.  The
brushes are behind the paint cans, is precisely so that the interlocutor can find the trajector,
employing the landmark as a point of reference in order to do so. The “finding” may be
purely mental, with no intent of actually reaching the target and interacting with it, but
in either case the conceptualizer traces the same mental path (from reference point to
search domain to target) by way of apprehending the locative relationship. The mental
operation of scanning along this path is immanent in the conception of someone actually
following it to the target, and possibly also in the conception of the target moving to its
current position.
40 This conceptual characterization of prepositions is indicative of their intermediate status,
which has several dimensions. First, as noted earlier, they are intermediate in regard to
the lexicon-grammar continuum. Second, they are intermediate in terms of grammatical
category,  where noun and verb represent a maximal opposition.  Finally,  prepositions
have  intermediate  status  with  respect  to  the  distance  scale  and  the  active  vs.
circumstantial realms.
41 Talmy (1983, 1988) groups prepositions with grammatical elements on the basis of their
being limited in number (“closed-class” forms) as well as the nature of their meanings
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(“topological”). I think he would agree, however, that we are not faced here with a sharp
dichotomy, and that prepositions are not the best examples of closed-class elements. If
one considers not just the core set of fully grammaticized prepositions (in,  on,  under, 
beside, etc.), but the entire range of conventional prepositional locutions (inlcuding by the
side of, at the top of, in the bottom of, etc.), it is not at all clear that the class is really closed.
The continuous process of new prepositions arising through grammaticization is itself an
indication that the distinction is a matter of degree. And while they may not have the rich
content of typical lexical items, prepositions have definite conceptual meanings that are
sometimes fairly  elaborate.  Indeed,  spatial  prepositions  are  themselves  subject  to
grammaticization  involving  semantic  attenuation,  giving  rise  to  uses  that  are
indisputably “grammatical” (Genetti 1986).
42 With respect to grammatical category, prepositions are intermediate between the two
most fundamental classes, noun and verb, whose conceptual characterizations are polar
opposites.  Characterized  schematically,  a  noun  designates  a  thing  (i.e.  a  grouping
apprehended holistically as a unitary entity),  whereas a verb designates a process (a
relationship  scanned  sequentially  in  its  evolution  through  time).  Prepositions  lie  in
between: they resemble verbs because they designate relationships; they resemble nouns
because this relationship is apprehended holistically rather than sequentially (Langacker
2008d). As with adjectives (with which they form a larger class),  their holistic nature
allows their use as noun modifiers: that pretty vase; the vase on my desk. At the same time,
their relational nature allows their use as clausal heads; to function in this capacity, they
combine with be—which designates a schematic process—to form a complex verb that
follows their evolution through time: That vase is pretty; The vase is on my desk. 
43 Though it may be extended in various ways, in its basic sense a be-type verb designates a
stable relationship. It is thus a hallmark of the circumstantial realm. I have noted that the
best examples of relationships in this realm—“best” by virtue of being the most stable,
being maximally distinct from actions, and involving setting-like elements—can hardly be
regarded as typical. While expressions like Belgium is in Europe certainly have their place,
we more commonly say things like The cat is under your bed. In uses reasonably considered
canonical, a preposition designates the relationship between a participant and a location
toward the middle of the distance scale. Often, in fact, the location is defined in reference
to  another  participant,  e.g.  The  remote  is  under  that  pillow.  In  this  respect  spatial
prepositions straddle the active and circumstantial realms. They are also intermediate in
that  canonical  spatial  relationships  are  stable  yet  contingent:  though  static  at  least
momentarily, hence part of the current layout, they are generally construed in relation to
movement or interaction. The relationship designated by The cat is under your bed is stable
only in local terms; it  would normally be conceived as resulting from the cat having
moved there, probably for some purpose (e.g. to escape the rowdy children), or as raising
the question of how to get it out. Likewise, The remote is under that pillow implies that
someone put it and left it there, and specifies where to find it in order to use it.
44 So  even  when  left  implicit,  movement  and  interaction  cast  their  shadow  on  the
circumstantial  realm.  The  evocation  of  these  active-realm  phenomena  animates  the
description  of  spatial  location,  with  the  consequence  that  even  the  most  stable
relationships  are  conceived as  having a  dynamic  character  rather  than being purely
static.  This  bears  on  two  issues  raised  at  the  outset:  the  basic  question and  the
alignment question.
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45 The basic question is whether spatial prepositions should in fact be regarded as spatial in
nature,  or  whether  a  functional  characterization  might  be  more  fundamental  and
descriptively adequate. I suggest, however, that a definite choice between these options
may not be essential  for analyzing prepositions.  More important is  to recognize that
spatial and interactive considerations are closely bound up with one another, even to the
point  being  indissociable.  An  entity’s  location  makes  possible  a  certain  range  of
interactions involving it (e.g. contact with an upper surface allows support). Conversely,
interactions  provide  a  basis  for  characterizing  spatial  relationships  (e.g.  order  of
encounter  for  avant).  It  is  thus  to  be  expected  that  interactive  and  configurational
properties might be bundled in a single morphological package. They constitute related
aspects of prepositional meaning whose importance varies depending on the preposition
and how it is used. Still, it does not necessarily follow that their spatial and functional
aspects are exactly equal in status. There are grounds for suspecting that the former may
have some degree of primacy.
46 The alignment question pertains to the entities focused as trajector and landmark. It
involves a  seeming disparity,  at  two different  levels,  between the alignment actually
observed and the one that might be anticipated on other grounds. Let’s take a canonical
example: The kitten is in the box. One disparity concerns the specific function associated
with the preposition. For in, this function is containment, with the container serving as
landmark (secondary focal element), and the content as trajector (primary focal element).
The kitten and the box are thus its trajector and its landmark, respectively. Observe,
however, that verbs describing the containment function—verbs like hold, contain, enclose,
protect, control—exhibit the reverse alignment: if the kitten is in the box, then the box
contains the kitten. If function were predominant, the trajector/landmark alignment of
prepositions would at best be unanticipated.
47 A comparable disparity can be noted even considering prepositions in purely spatial
terms. As the schematic description of spatial prepositions, I have offered a conceptual
characterization  based  on  reference  point  relationships  (which  also  provide  the
schematic  import  of  possessives—hence the close connection between possessive and
locative  constructions  [Langacker  2002,  2004a]).  Abstracting  away  from  all  specific
content, the schema consists in cognitive operations immanent in the conception of any
particular spatial relationship: the conceptualizer traces a mental path that leads from a
reference point,  to a search domain defined in terms of it,  to a target found in that
location.  Since  these  same  operations  are  inherent  in  the  conception  of  someone
searching  for  the  target  and finding  it,  they  amount  to  a  partial  simulation of  that
process.  However,  while the target is the trajector of a preposition, it  represents the
landmark (or object) of verbs like seek and find. If the kitten is in the box, one can find the
kitten by searching there.
48 What these disparities suggest is that the trajector of a spatial preposition is conceived
primarily as a mover. I am not claiming that it always actually moves, nor denying the
importance (and in some uses the predominance) of interactive functions. I am merely
saying that the archetype of moving around in space represents the optimal point of
departure for describing the trajector’s semantic role—what Vandeloise might refer to as
its logical impetus. In canonical uses of path prepositions, e.g. The kitten crawled into the
box, the trajector actually is a mover: into the box specifies the path followed by the kitten
while crawling. In various ways, moreover, movement has a least a shadow presence in
simple descriptions of location, like The kitten is in the box. For one thing, stable location
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represents the limiting (degenerate) case of movement, that where change in position
through time falls to zero. More concretely, the trajector’s position typically results from
prior  motion,  whether  self-induced  or  effected  by  another  agent  (either  the  kitten
crawled into the box or someone put it there). What about expressions like Cleveland is in
Ohio, where the trajector never moves at all? Though static, the trajector is still the entity
whose  location  is  at  issue,  to  be  distinguished  from  other  conceivable  locations.
Apprehending a locative specification must to some extent involve the conception of
alternatives,  in  each  of  which  the  trajector  occupies  a  candidate  location.  However
tenuous it  may be,  this  evocation of  the trajector in multiple locations bears a faint
resemblance to—in fact, is immanent in—the conception of actual motion.
49 Despite the importance of  interactive functions,  the trajector/landmark alignment of
spatial prepositions has its impetus in movement (be it actual, prior, potential, virtual, or
vestigial). The trajector’s role as mover is even reflected in the basic functions: support,
containment, seeking and finding. If X is on Y, the support afforded by Y keeps X from
falling. If X is in Y, the containment effected by Y keeps X from moving in any direction. In
descriptions of stable location, the trajector’s potential for being in different locations
creates the need to seek and find it. So while interaction and spatial configuration are
closely bound up with one another,  and are both essential  to the characterization of
prepositions, the latter has a certain claim to primacy. The term spatial preposition,
although it represents a considerable oversimplification, is not a complete misnomer.
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RÉSUMÉS
Vandeloise dans ses recherches a remis en question la spatialité comme valeur intrisèque des
prepositions spatiales. Il a souligné l’importance – voire la prédominance – des considérations
fonctionnelles.  Dans le cas de la préposition in par exemple,  la fonction de contenant est  au
moins  aussi  importante  que  celle  d’inclusion  spatiale ;  de  la  même  manière,  la  fonction  de
support est centrale au sens de la préposition on. Cette idée pourtant ne tient pas compte des
problèmes tels que le poids relatif des facteurs spatiaux et fonctionnels, et la manière dont ils
sont liés.  Plus précisément,  si  l’on accepte que les fonctions en question sont fondamentales,
pourquoi la notion de support ou de contenant/contenu est grammaticalement décrite comme
objet de la préposition (alors que les verbes tels contain et support la choisissent comme sujet) ?
Ces questions sont traitées dans le cadre d’analyse de la grammaire considérée comme le produit
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et l’instrument d’une cognition incarnée qui est le reflet de la manière dont nous appréhendons
le monde et nous interagissons avec lui.
In his research on spatial prepositions, Vandeloise raised the basic question of whether they are
really  spatial  in  nature.  He  clearly  established  the  importance—if  not  the  predominance—of
functional considerations. In the case of in,  for example, the container function is at least as
important as spatial inclusion; likewise, the support function is central to the meaning of on.
Accepting the validity of this insight leaves certain issues unresolved, such as the relative weight
of spatial and functional factors and how they relate to one another. And more specifically, if the
functions  in  question  are  really  fundamental,  why  is  the  containing  or  supporting  element
expressed grammatically as the preposition’s object (in contrast to verbs like contain and support,
which  choose  it  as  their  subject)?  These  matters  are  addressed  in  the  context  of  a  broader
examination of grammar viewed as a product and instrument of embodied cognition and thus
reflective of how we apprehend and interact with the world.
INDEX
Mots-clés : archétypes conceptuels, cognition incarnée, grammaire cognitive, prépositions
spatiales
Keywords : cognitive grammar, conceptual archetypes, embodied cognition, spatial prepositions
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